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	19 March 1963	
EMORANDUM FOR:	Deputy Director (Intelligence)	
UBJECT :	The Current Albanian Situation and US Pelicy	
	SUMMARY	<u>:</u>
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DISCUSSION

Internal Conditions

- 6. The best test of the political stability of the Hoxha-Shehu regime is its ability to continue in power after having challenged the Soviet leadership. The efficient Hoxha-Shehu power apparatus has been and remains impenetrable to Soviet or Yugoslav subversion. The last known Soviet effort to subvert the Albanian regime came in the summer of 1960—well before the climax of the Soviet-Albanian dispute. This led to the disappearance of Politburo member and party secretary Liri Belishova, as well as Control Commission chief Koco Tashko, in Reptember of that year.
- 7. At the same time, there is evidence that some Albanians—intellectuals, military personnel, and students who have studied in the Soviet bloc-disapprove of the regime's pro-Chinese and anti-Soviet line. An undetermined number of these—some of whom were probably members of the party apparatus below the central committee level—were purged in the first four to six months after the break with the USBR. While we doubt that these purges have eliminated all those who could be termed pro-Soviet, we believe that those remaining are suppressed, unorganized, and politically insignificant.
- 8. The Albanian people are in general far from satisfied with their economic and political conditions. The emergence of the Seviet-Albanian dispute and the resulting near isolation of their country, however, has not appreciably increased either the strength or activity of any opposition. Appeals to nationalism after the break actually brought some increase in popular support, but such appeals are now losing their efficacy. The regime has prevented a crystallizing of mass discontent through careful maintenance of a supply of consumer goods—particularly food and clothing—adequate by Albanian standards.

small-scale guerrilla activity in the northern and southern border areas. It is difficult.

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Approved For Release 2004/12/01: CIA-RDP79T00429A00130020014-9 however, to assess the extent of such activity and to determine whether it is indigenous 25X1 In any event, the regime retains full control of the military and the ruthlessly efficient Sigurimi, the state's security organization. The latter has played the primary role over the past 18 years in putting down any opposition to the regime. Role of Communist China 10. The Albanian standard of living has always been low, and it has not required much in the way of Chinese consumer products, Chinese wheat, or Chinese-financed wheat to maintain it. However, 25X1 overall Chinese "aid" has fallen below the expectations of the Albanian leadership. the withdrawal of Chinese technicians, which apparently has been going on since last fall, means a Chinese abandonment of their Albanian allies. The absence of any accurate information on Chinese trade and credits, on the number of Chinese technicians in Albania, and on the number who allegedly have been departing 25X1 diffi-We suspect, however, that such Chicult to assess. nese technicians as may have left Albania were employed in making preliminary industrial surveys which have now been completed. il. Chinese aid has not been sufficient to maintain the momentum of the original Albanian development plan, which was drafted before the dispute. The Albanians were consequently forced to scale down their program. Nevertheless, they announced late last year that work had been completed, had begun, or would begin this year on at least 16 of the 25 industrial projects promised by China under its 1961-65 credit agreement. Cooperation agreements signed in December and January provide for exchanges of technicians in 1963. 25X1

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